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First, I argue that scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing 
verisimilitude in science’s theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical 
verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension of scientific progress. Third, I 
defend my previous argument that unjustified changes in scientific belief may be 
progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promote scientific progress in 
ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude. 
 
1. Scientific Progress Without Increasing Verisimilitude 
 
Niiniluoto (2014, p. 77) argues that ‘scientific progress can be defined by increasing 
verisimilitude’, and against Bird’s (2007, 2008) view that scientific progress should 
be understood in terms of knowledge.1 In the course of his discussion, Niiniluoto 
criticizes my arguments against Bird’s view, which appear in Rowbottom 2008 & 
2010. The first goal of this paper is to respond to those criticisms. The second is to 
illustrate that Niiniluoto’s view of progress is too narrow. 
 
                                                
1 I am broadly sympathetic to Niiniluoto’s criticisms of Bird’s view, several of which were anticipated 
by Cevolani and Tambolo (2013). So I will not discuss those. 
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I will jump straight to the second, bolder, task. (Let’s start with a bang!) How can we 
show that scientific progress should not be ‘defined by increasing verisimilitude’? We 
need only find a single case, hypothetical or actual, where the verisimilitude of 
scientific theories fails to increase, yet science nevertheless makes progress. Then we 
may conclude that increasing verisimilitude in the content of science is not necessary 
for, even if it turns out to be sufficient for, scientific progress. 
 
I’ll give such a hypothetical case in the next paragraph. But beforehand, I must 
prepare the ground by signaling my agreement with Niiniluoto (2011) on two matters. 
First, the notion of scientific progress is normative: ‘the theory of scientific progress 
is not merely a descriptive account of the patterns of developments that science has in 
fact followed. Rather, it should give a specification of the values or aims that can be 
used as the constitutive criteria for “good science”.’ Hence, ‘[t]he task of finding and 
defending such standards is a genuinely philosophical one which can be enlightened 
by history and sociology but which cannot be reduced to empirical studies of science.’ 
(ibid.) Second, progress may be multi-faceted: ‘Progress is a goal-relative concept. 
But even when we consider science as a knowledge-seeking cognitive enterprise, 
there is no reason to assume that the goal of science is one-dimensional.’ (ibid.) This 
is the case in Niiniluoto’s own account, in so far as both truth and informativeness (or 
what Kuhn called ‘scope’) are significant. On a one-dimensional account focused on 
truth, by way of contrast, making modern science’s claims closer to the truth by 
limiting its domain, e.g. by throwing out all scientific theories except those of 
biomechanics, could be progressive. 
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Brace yourself. It’s thought experiment time.2 Imagine that all the leading scientists 
working in a specific area of physics have gathered to discuss the state of their field. 
(This could be mechanics, for instance.) They all agree that they have identified the 
true general theory in the domain. Moreover, it is true that they have identified the 
true general theory in the domain, and their beliefs that they have done so are 
justified. (So estimated verisimilitude equals actual verisimilitude.) They discuss what 
they should do next, if anything. Is there any further scientific progress possible in 
their area? If not, then it would be reasonable for them to crack open a jeroboam of 
champagne, celebrate their great success, and move on to new things. 
 
Now Niiniluoto’s view entails that no more scientific progress is possible in the area, 
because a true general (i.e., maximally verisimilar) theory has been found. The 
corollary is that it would be acceptable for the scientists to cease working in that 
area.3 But this is incorrect. Why? First, the true theory could be difficult, or even 
impossible, to use for predictive purposes. It could concern some initial conditions 
that are beyond our ability to determine the values of. Or it could be unusable in many 
situations in which predictions would be desirable, due to the need for arduous 
calculations. Second, even if it were of considerable predictive use, it might fail to 
                                                
2 I cannot make it my business to defend the use of thought experiments here, although I have 
reservations about their use in some circumstances. Suffice it to say two things. First, the other 
participants in this debate also use thought experiments (whether fully hypothetical or counterfactual in 
character) – Bird 2007, for example, is full of them – and I am fighting fire with fire. Second, I can see 
no easy way to avoid using fire, because even judgements about what might instead have happened in 
history are thought experimental (qua counterfactual) in character. 
3 Naturally, they could remain willing to re-examine the theory in the future, in the event that new 
evidence, questioning its truth, should come to light. 
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measure up to our explanatory expectations. Imagine that it involved considering 
numerous variables, such that it was hard to appreciate how changes in one would 
tend to affect changes in another, in many applications, without the use of extensive 
computer simulations. It would not serve to grant insight, or to build ‘physical 
intuition’. Consider also the role of models, and approximations and idealizations, in 
bringing theories into contact with experience. Think of pendulum motion. Knowing 
the true theory thereof is simply not enough. We want to know the models, like that of 
the simple pendulum, too. To be more specific, you could know the theory of real 
pendulum motion, in principle, without spotting that when the angle of swing is small, 
the sine of the angle is approximately equal to the angle, and hence that the motion is 
approximately simple harmonic provided that (approximately) no damping occurs.  In 
other words, the complete true theory is rather complex; it includes factors dealing 
with friction at the bearing, air friction, the mass of the rod, refers to the sin of the 
angle, and so on. Therefore it obscures the result that pendulum motion is 
approximately simple harmonic, in the aforementioned circumstances. It is true that 
this result can be derived from the true theory. But such derivations are sometimes 
extremely difficult, and making them requires a lot of effort.4 
 
                                                
4 Another brief example, of a different type, may be helpful. Consider Bohm’s theory of quantum 
mechanics, as against an indeterministic alternative (such as Popper’s, which involves single case 
probabilities). The former may be a neater and easier way to think of matters in many contexts – to 
build physical intuition about what will happen in various experimental scenarios, and to avoid worries 
about the effects of measurement – although it may be further away from the truth. The world might 
really be indeterministic, and particles might lack definite positions, for example. For more on Bohm’s 
theory, see Cushing (1994). 
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How might Niiniluoto respond? One option is to say that any remaining work in the 
field has the character of engineering, rather than science. First, however, this seems 
to inappropriately marginalize applied science. Do we really want to say that any 
work to generate new predictions from a true theory, once a true theory is found, 
counts as non-scientific? (Kuhn, for one, would have disagreed; classification and 
prediction are both parts of his ‘normal science’, as detailed in chapter three of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.5) Do we want to say that Lagrangian mechanics 
was a development in engineering, rather than physics, in so far as it did not question 
Newton’s laws of motion? It is a curiosity, then, that Lagrangian mechanics is widely 
regarded as a theoretical development in physics. Second, more trenchantly, even if 
we accept that improving the predictive power of theories – e.g. by reformulating 
them or developing models to apply them – is not part of science, such developments 
promote understanding and insight too. So if we took the ‘only engineering remains’ 
line, we would be forced to conclude that improving understanding of how 
phenomena interrelate does not, by itself, count as scientifically progressive.6  
 
Another response is to deny that the scenario in the thought experiment is possible. 
And the most natural way to do this, I think, is to suggest that any true general theory, 
in a given area, must also be maximally virtuous relative to possible alternatives, i.e. 
maximally simple, comprehensible, predictively useful, and so forth.7 There is 
                                                
5 See also the more detailed discussion in Rowbottom 2011b & 2011c. 
6 I hold a non-factive account of understanding, on which the propositions expressing an understanding 
may not be true, in line with that presented by Elgin (2007); we will return to this issue subsequently. 
7 Note that the ‘possible alternatives’ need not be general, or also have maximal scope; for example, 
there could be multiple alternatives with individually less scope, but jointly as much scope. Hence, it is 
not necessary to assume that there is more than one theory that saves all the phenomena in the domain. 
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plausibly no empirical evidence to this effect, from history, in so far as we haven’t 
acquired any true general theories. But even accepting that we have identified some 
such theories, the claim is comparative. And what empirical grounds do we have for 
making a conclusion about all possible alternatives, even restricting ‘possible’ to 
‘conceivable’, when we do not know how many unconceived alternatives there are, 
let alone what they look like? 
 
Moreover, there appears to be evidence from the history of science that T may be less 
virtuous than T*, in key respects, even when T is more verisimilar than T*. (That is, 
granting that the central theories in some domains have increased in verisimilitude.) 
For example, the two-spheres model of the universe – where Earth is stationary at the 
centre, and the sphere of stars rotates around it – is much simpler and easier to use, for 
navigation at night on the sea, than any truer model that I am aware of. Similarly, it is 
much easier to make everyday predictions in mechanics by disregarding relativistic 
considerations – and even by positing non-existent forces, such as the centrifugal, 
Euler, and Coriolis forces – than it is to take them into account. So why should we 
expect such results not to occur in the special case where T happens to be true, as well 
as more verisimilar than T*? Why not say as follows? Truth is sometimes stranger – 
more complex, more unaccommodating, less elegant, less comprehensible – than 
fiction. 
 
In fact, Niiniluoto (2002, pp. 183–184) seems to agree with this statement – and, 
moreover, that there is no a priori case to the contrary – in so far as simplicity is 
concerned (at least): 
 
Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
7 
[S]implex sigillum veri. This is a highly dubious metaphysical doctrine: why 
on earth should nature be simple? Why should there be any a priori reasons to 
regard simpler theories as more probable than their rivals? 
 
We should conclude that acquiring theories with greater verisimilitude is not 
necessary for progress, even if it is sufficient for progress. (In fact, I doubt it is even 
sufficient for progress. But I will save that argument, which is more intricate, for a 
different occasion.8) Niiniluoto’s account is too narrow. It disregards the significance 
of increasing predictive power and understanding (or inappropriately assumes that 
these only come on the coat tails of true, or approximately true, theories). 
 
In passing, before I continue, I should also mention my sympathy with the recent 
argument of Mizrahi (2014), to the effect that increasing know how – which, like 
Ryle, I take to be distinct from propositional knowledge9 – is an additional means by 
                                                
8 See Rowbottom (In Progress), where I develop my account of progress. For now, I would draw 
attention to the following passage, which has been missed by some commenting on my position 
(Rowbottom 2010, p. 245): 
 
I am not presupposing that science progresses by producing true or truer theories… the 
semantic view of scientific progress… only requires that science makes progress by 
discovering new truths… Such truths could take the form of ‘T1 is approximately empirically 
adequate in the class of circumstances C’, or even ‘T2 is false’, and so on. As such, I do not 
take the semantic view of progress [as Bird defines it] to presuppose scientific realism, or 
even structural or entity realism… I take it to be neutral on the realism issue. 
9 For recent criticism of this view, see Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011). See also 
Bengson and Moffett (2011). 
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which science can make progress.10 I just think truth – especially with respect to 
claims about observables – is rather more central, although I won’t be able to argue 
for that here. 
 
2. Increasing Verisimilitude Vs. Increasing Predictive Power and Understanding 
 
As Niiniluoto (2011) and I agree, recall, ‘there is no reason to assume that the goal of 
science is one-dimensional’. Thus, one might hold that increasing verisimilitude is the 
primary (or central) dimension of scientific progress, while accepting that there are 
other unrelated dimensions in which it can progress (even when maximal 
verisimilitude is achieved). And one might respond to the scenario described in the 
previous section by judging that further progress could be made, while denying that 
such forms of progress are as important, or valuable, as increasing verisimilitude 
(when that’s also possible).11 So in summary, to grant that increasing verisimilitude is 
unnecessary for making scientific progress is not to deny that increasing 
verisimilitude is the primary means of making scientific progress. 
 
                                                
10 I disagree with Mizrahi (2014), however, that we should relate accounts of scientific progress closely 
to the aims of scientists. As I argue in Rowbottom 2014, the aims of scientists bear no interesting 
relationship to what has been misleadingly called ‘the aim of science’. 
11 I suspect that Niiniluoto would find this option attractive, on the basis of the following passage:  
 
In my view, the axiology of science should… be governed by a primary rule: try to find the 
complete true answer to your cognitive problem, i.e. try to reach or approach this goal. 
Truthlikeness measures how close we come to this goal. As secondary rules, we may then 
require that our answer is justified, simple, consilient, etc. (Niiniluoto 2002, p. 174) 
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My response to this subtle move is to proffer another thought experiment, and elicit a 
judgement on the proper conduct of the scientists therein. Brace yourself again. 
 
Imagine that all the experts in a specific area of chemistry gather together to discuss 
how to direct future research. They unanimously agree – and are correct (in virtue of 
knowing, or believing justifiably, if you so wish) – that their two best strategic 
options will lead to two mutually exclusive outcomes. If they take the first, they will 
maximize their predictive power concerning, and understanding of, the phenomena 
with which their branch of chemistry is concerned. If they opt for the second, they 
will discover the true unified theory in that domain. Their dilemma arises because 
their resources are limited. Pursuing all the goals simultaneously would result in 
extremely limited progress in achieving each. Unfortunately, moreover, pursuing the 
truth will result in limited incidental progress toward maximising predictive power 
and understanding, and vice versa. 
 
After a heated discussion, the scientists unanimously agree that they should forego the 
chance to find the true theory of everything in their domain. Instead, they opt to 
pursue greater predictive power and understanding. Have they made the wrong 
decision, in some significant sense? Have they failed to do what ideal scientists would 
do, in such circumstances? 
 
I contend that it is reasonable to answer these questions in the negative, even if it is 
assumed that the scientists have no pressing practical need to achieve greater 
predictive power or understanding. And note that this is not to presume that the 
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scientists take the correct course of action, in pursuing predictive power and 
understanding. It suffices for each option to be as good, as scientific, as the other.12 
 
Why do I approve of their decision, and think that it is at least as good as the 
alternative? Grant, for the sake of argument, that finding the truth (about the 
unobservable, inter alia) has considerable intrinsic value.13 First, why deny that 
achieving understanding of how phenomena interrelate has similar value? I expect 
that Niiniluoto would not deny this, but would instead insist that truth is a necessary 
condition for understanding. This is suggested by the following passage (if we assume 
that understanding and explanation are appropriately related): 
 
The realist of course appreciates empirical success like the empiricist… But 
for the realist, the truth of a theory is a precondition for the adequacy of 
scientific explanations. (Niiniluoto 2002, p. 167) 
 
I take Elgin (2007) to have argued convincingly that understanding is non-factive, but 
will not rehearse her arguments here; that would be another paper. Instead, suffice it 
to say that differences of opinion on this matter are crucial. For if understanding 
requires true theories, then the thought experiment involves an impossible scenario. 
Understanding and truth would never come apart, as I contend that they can. 
                                                
12 I think that the scientists did take the correct option. I shall not argue for this view here, though, 
since my primary target is Niiniluoto’s account, and closely aligned possible accounts, of scientific 
progress. See Rowbottom (In Progress) for a defence of (axiological, as well as semantic) 
instrumentalism. 
13 I hold that the value is purely instrumental, but consider the assumption of intrinsic value to be a 
generous concession (to many realists) in this context. It also streamlines the discussion. 
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Second, even granting that understanding is factive, why deny that achieving great 
predictive power has value equal to that of finding true theories (with high scope)?14 
After all, this involves acquiring a means by which to derive many truths concerning 
observables. And as I have already argued in the previous section, acquiring the true 
theory in a domain does not entail acquiring the theory that will be the most 
predictively useful, or indeed a theory that will be of any predictive use whatsoever, 
in said domain. So I will rest my case on this issue. 
 
I take the following to be a reasonable stance. Achieving maximal verisimilitude is no 
more central to scientific progress than achieving maximal predictive power and 
understanding. Or to put it differently, the primary aspect of scientific progress should 
not be ‘defined [purely] by increasing verisimilitude’ (Niiniluoto 2014, p. 77). 
 
3. On Progressive Unjustified Scientific Beliefs 
 
I will now move on to resisting the criticism that Niiniliuoto offers of my main 
argument – presented in Rowbottom 2010 – against Bird’s (2007, 2008) knowledge-
based view of scientific progress. This is as follows: 
 
Rowbottom… argues that… “unjustified scientific beliefs may be 
progressive” by defending the semantic view by another thought experiment. 
Imagine two equally advanced planets with similar theories and technologies, 
                                                
14 The thought experiment can be adjusted so that it concerns only predictive power versus truth, if 
desired. 
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one with true beliefs without justification, the other with the same beliefs but 
with justification… 
 
[T]he primary application of the notion of scientific progress concerns 
successive theories which have been accepted by the scientific community. 
Some sort of tentative justification for such theories is presupposed (even by a 
radical fallibilist like Popper). Irrational beliefs and beliefs without any 
justification simply do not belong to the scope of scientific progress. 
(Niiniluoto 2014, p. 76) 
 
However, it appears that Niiniluoto and I use ‘justification’ in different senses; I think 
my sense is stronger than his, and is more influenced by contemporary epistemology. 
And I say this on the basis of his comment about Popper. For Popper (1983, p. 259) 
writes, of science: 
 
As to its authority, or confirmation, or probability, I believe that it is nil; it is 
all guesswork, doxa rather than epistēmē. 
 
Now whereas Niiniluoto takes Popper’s position to be compatible with ‘some sort of 
tentative justification for theories’ existing, most contemporary epistemologists would 
take the previous quotation to entail that the content of science is devoid of 
justification, as do I.15 And that’s because it denies that the content of science is 
                                                
15 Strictly speaking, talk of ‘justification of theories’ should be distinguished from talk of ‘justification 
of belief in theories’. It is important to distinguish between the content of a belief, and the believing 
itself, in order to understand critical rationalism. See Musgrave (1999, pp. 319–325). 
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probable (or confirmed). In support of this claim about epistemology, consider the 
words of Engel (2011): 
 
Fallibilists [about justification]… contend that the kind of justification 
requisite for knowledge need only render probable, but need not entail, that 
for which it is justification … [M]ost contemporary epistemologists have 
embraced fallibilism so that empirical knowledge remains at least in principle 
possible. Fallibilistic justification is thought to rule out epistemic luck by 
making one’s belief extremely probable. [Emphasis mine] 
 
Now consider Popper’s view on scientific theories, by way of comparison. Popper 
(1959, Appendix *vii) argued that the (logical) probability of any universal 
hypothesis is zero relative to any finite set of observation statements. It follows – on 
the additional assumption that there is no way other than observation by which to 
raise the probability of such theories – that they never possess ‘fallibilistic 
justification’ in the above sense.16 
 
However, this is not to deny that scientists operate with reasons. It is, as critical 
rationalists say, to deny that they operate with good reasons, rather than critical 
                                                
16 I could go into much more detail, and be much more precise, here – e.g., explain that the 
probabilities in question are not relevant if they are understood as subjective (or indeed aleatory) rather 
than logical in character, that statistical hypotheses will be in similar trouble when their domain is 
infinite, and so on – but I have already covered this elsewhere. See Rowbottom 2011a and Rowbottom 
2013. 
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reasons (at the very least, when it comes to comparing theories).17 It might be added 
that to deny the presence of justification in science is not to deny the presence of: (a) 
the appearance of justification (qua confirmation); or (b) community methods and 
even (Kuhnian) disciplinary matrices. And I did not want to suggest that we imagine a 
scenario, on either planet, where any of these aspects of science were not present. 
 
My presentation of the ‘two planets’ thought experiment treatment was also highly 
sensitive to which account of justification one prefers, and may be construed as 
comparative in character.18 Against non-reliabilists (e.g., internalists), for example, 
the thought experiment may be understood such that reliable methods are nevertheless 
employed on the planet where justification is absent. Reliable (and stable) movement 
towards the truth might be made on said planet, as a result. Unfortunately, the fine 
details of Niiniluoto’s preferred account of justification – internalist or externalist, 
foundationalist or coherentist, and so on – are not clear to me. So I cannot presently 
devise a version of the thought experiment that targets this. 
                                                
17 Several of Popper’s ex-students compare ‘good reasons’ with ‘critical reasons’. See, in particular, 
Bartley (1984) and Miller (1994). See also Popper (1983, pp. 19–20):  
 
[W]e cannot give any positive justification or any positive reason for our theories and our 
beliefs. That is to say, we cannot give any positive reason for holding our theories to be true… 
We can often give reasons for regarding one theory as preferable to another. They consist in 
pointing out that, and how, one theory has hitherto withstood criticism better than another. I 
will call such reasons critical reasons… Giving reasons for one’s preference can of course be 
called a justification (in ordinary language). But it is not justification in the sense criticized 
here. 
18 Rowbottom (2010) covers several such accounts, including the one preferred by Bird (2007, 2008) 
and Williamson (2000). 
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At this juncture, I might have appealed to the experiments of Mizrahi and Buckwalter 
(2014), on ordinary conceptions of scientific progress. Many subjects therein judged 
that progress sometimes occurs in the absence of justification (although they also 
judged that the addition of justification would result in more progress). And some 
readers may take this as evidence that progress is possible in the absence of 
justification. However, I believe that the results of thought experiments are theory-
laden, and that experts have many shared theories about science – based on awareness 
of its content, social structure, and history, inter alia – that non-experts lack.  Like 
Sorensen (2014), I therefore hold that folk responses to philosophical thought 
experiments are of no more significance to philosophy than folk responses to physical 
thought experiments are to physics. 
 
I will make one final point in this section. The thought experiment criticized by 
Niiniluoto can be modified to involve a planet with justified scientific beliefs falling 
short of knowledge (e.g., due to Gettier considerations) versus a planet with scientific 
knowledge. I noted this in the following passage, which Niiniluoto (2014) does not 
mention: 
 
I have made my task considerably more difficult than necessary, if the 
discussion is to be restricted to Williamson’s view of knowledge (which Bird 
supports). For on this view, it is possible to have justified true beliefs without 
knowledge and therefore the comparison might be drawn between planets 
inhabited by people with justified true scientific beliefs and people with 
scientific knowledge… (Rowbottom 2010, p. 242) 
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This version of the thought experiment is potentially effective against any version of 
the epistemic view of scientific progress, provided that justified true belief does not 
entail knowledge. Niiniluoto (2014) presents no objection to it. 
 
4. On False Beliefs Promoting Progress 
 
Briefly, in a footnote, Niiniluoto (2014, p. 76, f.9) also claims that: ‘Rowbottom’s 
other thesis that “false beliefs may promote progress” can be explicated by the notion 
of approximate truth.’ But I am dubious that any such explication is required. 
 
Perhaps Niiniluoto has in mind that false beliefs which promote progress must be 
approximately true (or closer to the truth than their predecessors)? I grant that some 
(hypothetical or actual) situations where false beliefs promote progress can be 
explained in such a way. For example, Kepler’s laws were plausibly more truth-like 
than any earlier theories concerning planetary trajectories, and belief in those laws 
was partly responsible for movement away from long-entrenched metaphysical views 
about (the unchanging, perfect, circular nature of) celestial motion that impeded 
progress in astronomy. However, as I will show below, flatly false beliefs can also 
promote progress. 
 
But maybe Niiniluoto thinks instead that adding a (totally) false statement to a theory 
T may result in a new theory, T*, which is more verisimilar than T? Again, I grant the 
point. But I do not see how this provides a general explication of why “false beliefs 
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may promote progress”. That’s because there are many other ways in which false 
beliefs can promote progress. 
 
First, consider how false community belief that a true theory is well-confirmed can 
promote progress. Imagine a leading scientist lies about performing an experiment to 
test the theory (because he lacks funds to do it), but if he had performed the 
experiment, he would have got (approximately) the same results as those that he 
fabricated. The lies, and the resultant false beliefs in the scientist’s testimony, 
promote community belief in the theory. And then experiments to test the theory are 
performed, much sooner than they otherwise would have been. The theory is 
genuinely corroborated as a result! (And you are welcome to imagine this results in 
knowledge that the theory is genuinely corroborated, and thereby of the theory. Then 
the example tells against Bird’s (2007, p. 84) extraordinary view that: ‘developments 
that promote knowledge will themselves be knowledge’.) 
 
Second, consider a false theory that is widely accepted to be true, because it has been 
employed repeatedly to make successful predictions. Eventually, it is used to make a 
false prediction. But that prediction is false only because of the assumption of, due to 
community belief in, initial conditions that do not obtain. The theory is then correctly 
classified as false, as a result. Isn’t that progress promoted by a false belief?19 If 
Neptune had not been located on the basis of Le Verrier’s calculations, for instance, 
then it might have been realized earlier than it was that Newtonian mechanics is false. 
The point here rests on Duhem’s thesis, that theories cannot be tested in isolation. The 
                                                
19 Note that the false belief, here, might involve another theory used to calculate the initial conditions. 
So here, a false belief in a theory may be directly responsible for progress. 
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prediction of the orbit of Uranus, which was found to be incorrect, employed 
Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation, along with data on the masses and positions 
of the planets in the solar system. But the data on masses and positions of the planets 
in the solar system may not have been approximately true, in so far as Neptune was 
not included. 
 
There are several other ways in which false (and not approximately true) beliefs can 
promote progress: belief that two theories are true or approximately so, when one is 
(or both are) not, may encourage scientists to conjoin the theories, and conjoining 
them may be useful for many predictive purposes; belief that an experiment was 
poorly performed, when it was not, may encourage a scientist to repeat it, and the 
circumstances (i.e., variables not controlled for) may change in such a way as to make 
the experiment give a different result, thereby promoting useful theory revisions; and 
so on. But I shall not overegg the pudding by providing a long list. I rest my case. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
First, scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in 
science’s theories. Second, central aspects of scientific progress do not involve 
science’s theories increasing in verisimilitude. Third, unjustified changes in scientific 
belief may be progressive. And fourth, false beliefs can promote scientific progress in 
ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude. 
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